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Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court
to grant summary judgment to a plaintiff or a defendant if the plead-
ings, depositions, affidavits, and other papers show that "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law."' The rule further allows the
court to render summary judgment on liability alone, leaving the
amount of damages for determination at trial.2
The summary judgment rule was first adopted in 1938. 3 The rule
was amended in the late 1940s, and amended again in 1963. 4 Not all
courts have been enthusiastic about summary judgment.' This aver-
sion stems from a deeply felt belief that all parties are entitled to their
day in court6 and from a fear that judges might use the rule to clear
their dockets with unseemly speed.7 The amendments, especially the
present subsection (e), were designed to strengthen the rule and
counter this hostility.8
Within the last several years, the United States Supreme Court
has lent its efforts to promote summary judgment. In a trio of cases,
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,9 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,'0 and Matsushita
Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.," all decided in the
same term, the Court in essence lightened the task of moving defend-
ants. In Celotex, the Court held that a moving party need not negate
an opposing party's claim in order to be granted summary judgment. 2
If a non-moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, that
party must present enough evidence to create a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact on that point; in the absence of such evidence, summary judg-
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
2. Id.
3. William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining
Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 465-66 (1984).
4. Id.
5. See id. at 466.
6. Ronald S. Rosen & Douglas C. Fairhurst, Summary Judgment in Copyright, Trade-
mark, and Unfair Competition Cases, in LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK AND UN-
FAIR COMPETITION CASES 473, 475 (PLI Litig. Course Handbook Series No. 224, 1983).
7. See, e.g., California Apparel Creators v. Weider of California, 162 F.2d 893, 903
(2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting); Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 466.
8. See subdivision (a), which states that "an adverse party may not rest upon the new
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response .. .must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." See also FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e) advisory
committee's note to 1963 amendment.
9. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
10. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
11. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
12. 477 U.S. at 323.
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ment is properly granted.13 In Anderson, the Court held that a court
considering a summary judgment motion must consider the standard
of proof needed to establish a claim or defense. 14 If the standard is
higher than a mere preponderance of the evidence, the court must
take this higher standard into account when deciding whether the
non-moving party has presented evidence that creates a genuine issue
of material fact.'5 In Matsushita, the Court stated, "[If the factual
context renders respondents' claim implausible-if the claim is one
that simply makes no economic sense-respondents must come for-
ward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would
otherwise be necessary.' 6 The "implausible" claim in Matsushita was
an alleged predatory pricing conspiracy, but this useful quotation may
have a far wider application.
Much ink has been spilled in cases and commentaries defining
"genuine issues" and "material facts."' 7 A complete discussion of
these terms is beyond the scope of this article. Generally, an issue of
"material fact" is one that must be resolved to determine the outcome
of the suit.' 8 If the trier of fact must make a decision about a fact in
order to determine the outcome, the fact is material. For example, in
a copyright infringement action, a factual dispute involving access is
not material if there is no substantial similarity between the two works
being compared. A "genuine issue" is one about which reasonable
persons could disagree. 9 If the evidence would lead reasonable per-
sons to only one conclusion, there is no "genuine issue" and no need
for trial. Courts have also articulated this test by inquiring whether
the moving party's evidence would require a court to enter a directed
verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the moving
party's favor.2" If so, summary judgment is properly granted.2'
To obtain a summary judgment, the moving party must produce
admissible evidence showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.22 The party opposing summary judgment must then show by
its own evidence the existence of a genuine issue of "material" fact
13. Id. at 322-23.
14. 477 U.S. at 252.
15. Id.
16. 475 U.S. at 587.
17. See generally 6 JAMES MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.15
(1981); Alan J. Hartnick, Summary Judgment in Copyright: From Cole Porter to Superman,
3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53 (1984).
18. Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 469-81.
19. Id. at 481-89.
20. Id. at 481.
21. Id.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
that must be resolved by trial and may not simply rest on the plead-
ings and attack the credibility of an affidavit.23 If the non-moving
party does not respond adequately, summary judgment may be
granted.24
At the appellate level, the standard of review is generally de
novo, since the complete record is before the panel and judgment was
rendered as a matter of law. 25 If the lower court's judgment appears
to rest on a substantial factual record or in some way involves a trial
court's special expertise, the appellate court might use the clearly er-
roneous standard.26
This Article focuses on reported copyright infringement cases in
which one party moves for summary judgment on the issue of substan-
tial similarity. This is a small but extremely problematic subclass of
copyright summary judgment cases.27 The Article attempts two tasks.
First, it synthesizes many holdings in order to discern in general what
each party must do to obtain or resist a summary judgment. 28  The
Article attempts to survey all reported copyright cases involving sum-
mary judgment, regardless of the nature of property involved. The
second task is narrower. It proposes a method of inquiry that might
profitably be used in cases dealing with literary properties.
29
23. See Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 485.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). As the Supreme Court held in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
"Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment.., against a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." 477 U.S. at 322. The Court
further held that there was no "express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving
party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's
claim." Id. at 323 (emphasis in original).
25. Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 489.
26. Id.
27. The paper thus excludes cases dealing with (1) the ownership or validity of a copy-
right, see, e.g., Kennyvonne Music Inc. v. CBS, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Siewek Tool Co. v. Morton, 128 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1954); (2) the nature of a copy-
righted work (e.g., whether it is art or a useful article), see, e.g., Norris Indus. v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983); (3) unauthorized performance, see,
e.g., Bernstein v. Adams Getschall Broadcasting Co., 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 286 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); (4) originality, see, e.g., Trowler v. Phillips, 260 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1958); and (5)
cases dealing with demurrers and injunctions, see, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
J.A.R. Sales, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
The author originally intended to also include fair use cases in the survey. But, the
issues differ so greatly from those of substantial similarity that any attempt to incorporate
them would be impractical. Fair use is so often a question of fact that summary judgment
on that issue is rare, though not impossible. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
28. See infra part I.
29. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
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Summary judgment based on the issue of substantial similarity
creates tension between legal theory and practice. On one hand, the
standard test for substantial similarity requires the response of the or-
dinary lay observer.3" Thus, this issue would seem to be the arche-
typal jury question, for which summary judgment would never be
appropriate. The economics of litigation, however, requires that sum-
mary judgment be available in copyright infringement cases to carry
out the overriding purpose of the Federal Rules: "to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. '"3 1
The availability of summary judgment becomes especially critical
when the disputed property is a television show or film. As the finan-
cial stakes are high, the rights of both plaintiffs and defendants can be
seriously compromised. It is safe to say that the owner of a hit movie
or television show and its cohorts will soon thereafter be defendants in
at least one lawsuit. And successful properties are easily imitated or
exploited without authorization.32 If non-meritorious suits or suits in-
volving obviously dissimilar properties must be fully litigated, rights
become too expensive to enforce. Summary judgment, while not ex-
actly bargain-basement,33 offers plaintiffs and defendants a way of
protecting their rights that may not require them to bankrupt them-
selves in the process.
This discussion begins with a survey of reported cases dealing
with substantial similarity, categorized by moving and opposing
party,34 summarizing arguments that have proven successful in each
30. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[E] [hereinafter NIMMER].
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
32. See Ronald S. Rosen, Current Trends in Entertainment Litigation: The Insurance
Empire Strikes Back, 1 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 5-8 (1982), for the origin of these suits.
33. Because Rule 56 permits extensive discovery, it is still possible to run up enormous
legal bills without ever getting to trial. Some defendants have solved this problem by mov-
ing for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, attaching the
disputed properties to the motion, and asking the judge to convert the motion to a Rule 56
summary judgment motion, as permitted by Rule 12(b)(6). See Stillman v. Leo Burnett
Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (N.D. Ill. 1989). This procedure seems risky, but it has worked
in other cases as well. See Midwood v. Paramount Pictures Corp., Copyright L. Rep.
(CCH) 25,292 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1981) (film Posse not substantially similar to short
story Sheriff); Mount v. The Viking Press, Inc., No. 75 Civ. 550 (JMC), slip op. (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 22, 1977) (art books not substantially similar).
In one case, defendants moved for summary judgment before answering. Even at this
early stage, they were able to eliminate three of the four allegedly infringed properties
from the case. Novak v. NBC, 716 F. Supp. 745, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Saturday Night Live
TV skits).
34. See infra part I.
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category. The high percentage of successful defendant motions for
summary judgment 5 and their recognizable pattern suggest that many
non-meritorious suits are being brought, owing, at least in part, to the
inadequacy of existing "tests" for substantial similarity.36 In an effort
to make the inquiry more principled and less ad hoc, a method is sug-
gested that more accurately reflects the mental processes of readers or
viewers comparing two literary works for their similarities. 37 If a rea-
sonable method for comparing two works emerges, it may reduce the
number of marginal suits, by eliminating those prepared by conscien-
tious counsel who simply cannot tell, given the present state of the




A plaintiff seeking summary judgment for substantial similarity
will have to show, in most cases, that the defendant's work is nearly
identical to his or that some unusual circumstance conclusively dem-
onstrates copying." Summary judgment is infrequently granted to
plaintiffs on this issue. Most cases involve non-literary works:39 toys, 40
cartoon characters,41 wall plaques, 42 video games,43 maps,44 fabrics, 45
35. See infra part I.D.
36. See infra notes 166-201 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
38. It is also helpful to show some kind of intent, such as the deliberate attempt to
capitalize on the success of an already-established product or deceptive behavior. In SAS
Inst., Inc. v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), a com-
puter software manufacturer obtained a partial summary judgment against another com-
puter company, subject to the plaintiff's copyright being found valid. When, at trial, the
court found a valid copyright, it incorporated the summary judgment findings into the final
judgment. In this case, not only was the copying obvious, but the defendants also had
entered into a licensing agreement with the plaintiffs to use the plaintiffs' software, deliber-
ately intending to steal the source code and use it to make their own software package.
39. For the purposes of this Article, non-literary work is defined by exception to the
definition of literary work found at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
40. Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (plastic Disney figures,
baby dolls); Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Genie Toys, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Mo. 1980)
(stuffed dogs dressed like "Casey Jones" railroad engineers).
41. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.) (summary judgment
granted in unreported opinion; Disney characters used in underground comics), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1978); DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F.
Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (Superman and Wonder Woman characters used to deliver sing-
ing telegrams).
42. Miller Studios, Inc. v. Pacific Import Co., 39 F.R.D. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
43. Bally Midway Mfg. Co. v. American Postage Mach. Inc., Copyright L. Rep. (CCH)
25,601 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (video games and characters); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 571 F. Supp. 282 (D. Neb. 1983) (video games and characters). Midway
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designs on clothing,46 magazine covers,47 auto parts containers,48 pho-
tographs,49 and computer software."0 In each instance, the defendant
had either substantially appropriated the plaintiff's work or had repro-
duced it with minor alterations, such as the removal of the plaintiff's
name and copyright notice.'
Printed materials that have been the subject of summary judg-
ment motions include a construction trade directory,5 2 an engineering
training manual5 3 a cake decorating booklet,5 4 an instruction package
for data processing,5 a book about the television show "Twin Peaks"
that contained detailed plot summaries of the TV episodes as well as
numerous lines of dialogue, 6 and excerpts from a book of memoirs
written by the Shah of Iran's last ambassador to Great Britain, pub-
lished in the London Sunday Times.17 Sections of the cake-decorating
booklet 58 and sections of the engineering manual59 were incorporated
also obtained summary judgments in two other cases, both unreported: Midway Mfg. Co.,
v. Marcon Indus., Inc., No. 81-470 (D. Fla. 1982) and Midway Mfg. Co. v. KK Indus. Serv.
Co., No. 81-674 (D. Ariz. 1982). See Dirkschneider, 571 F. Supp. at 286.
44. Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., 606 F.Supp. 933 (N.D. Il1. 1984)
(defendant used plaintiff's map book to produce computer data base); Champion Map v.
Twin Printing Co., 350 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (wall map infringed by folding
version).
45. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y.), affd,
415 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1969); Textile Innovations, Ltd. v. Original Textile Collections, Ltd.,
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 26,923 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
46. Spectravest, Inc. v. Mervyn's Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Cofre, Inc. v.
Lollytogs, Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1546 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
47. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(magazine cover copied by movie poster).
48. Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 975 (D. Minn. 1986).
49. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), affg 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
50. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992).
51. Champion Map v. Twin Printing Co., 350 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
52. Sub-Contractors Register, Inc. v. McGovern's Contractors & Builders Manual,
Inc., 69 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
53. Eisenman Chem. Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 141 (D. Nev. 1984) (summary
judgment granted on third-party plaintiffs claim).
54. Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
55. Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Sys., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 767 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1985).
56. Twin Peaks Prod., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Inc., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
57. Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1985). In this case, defendants were
under the erroneous impression that if they only copied most of the portion of plaintiffs
book that appeared in the Sunday Times (about 10% of the total book) and translated the
English text into Farsi, they could escape liability for copyright infringement. They told the
judge that because the judge did not read or understand Farsi, he could not rule on the
substantial similarity of their translation to the original. The judge dismissed these
arguments.
58. See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d at 1173.
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verbatim into the defendant's materials. The appropriation in the
other cases was not quite so breathtaking. In these cases, the courts
were impressed not only by the "copious amounts" of verbatim copy-
ing, but also by the identity of format, layout, classification structure 60
and, in the directories, color and lettering.61 Moreover, the defend-
ants often reproduced the plaintiffs' typographical errors and other
peculiarities. 62 Such strong evidence of piracy justified granting sum-
mary judgments to the plaintiffs.
A plaintiff, or a party occupying a position similar to a plaintiff,
has been granted summary judgment in three cases involving works of
fiction. The circumstances surrounding the cases were quite unusual.
In Anderson v. Stallone,63 plaintiff wrote a thirty-one-page treatment
for a proposed Rocky IV film, after viewing the first three Rocky
films, and submitted it to MGM. 64 The inevitable lawsuit followed
when Rocky IV appeared and plaintiff received no compensation for
his treatment. 61 Stallone, owner of the Rocky copyrights, counter-
claimed for copyright infringement. Defendants moved for summary
judgment.66
The court found that plaintiff's treatment was not substantially
similar to Rocky IV.6 7 The court went further, however, and found
that plaintiff's treatment was itself an infringing work, since he had
appropriated the central group of Rocky characters from the first
three Rocky movies into an unauthorized derivative work.68
Although Stallone had not moved for summary judgment on his coun-
terclaim, the success of such a motion, if he had chosen to make it,
would have been assured.
59. In that case, the defendant had hired two employees who had written plaintiff's
training manual. The defendant's product "primarily" consisted of plaintiffs copy. Eisen-
man Chem. Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 141, 143-44 (D. Nev. 1984).
60. Defendant used "identical language" and the "same order" in copying plaintiff's
list of teaching materials. Deltak Inc. v. Advanced Sys., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 400, 402 (N.D.
Ill. 1983).
61. See Sub-Contractors Register, Inc. v. McGovern's Contractors & Builders Manual,
Inc., 69 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
62. See, e.g., Sub-Contractors Register, Inc. v. McGovern's Contractors & Builders
Manual, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 507; Eisenman Chem. Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 141;
Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171; Deltak, Inc., v. Advanced Sys., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 400;
Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296.
63. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
64. Id. at 1162.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1164.
67. Id. at 1169.
68. id. at 1166-67.
[Vol. 16:51
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Another unusual case is Burgess v. Chase-Riboud.6 9 Plaintiff, the
author of a play about a reputed mistress of Thomas Jefferson, filed a
declaratory relief action for a declaration that his play did not infringe
a prior book written by defendant on the same subject.70 On defend-
ant's summary judgment motion, the court held that the play did in-
fringe upon the book's copyright, as certain invented scenes from the
book had been incorporated into the play.71
The final case of summary judgment regarding a work of fiction,
Childress v. Taylor,7 2 involved two plays about Moms Mabley, in
which the defendant actress had appeared. The court found numer-
ous examples of verbatim copying in the second play.73 In fact, the
defendant considered herself (errouneously as it turned out) to be one
of the authors of the first play74 and therefore entitled to help herself
to its dialogue in fashioning the second play. This argument was un-
availing, however, and the plaintiff author of the first play obtained
summary judgment."
To summarize, plaintiffs have generally been granted summary
judgments in the past only in the face of egregious copying or some
other unusually compelling circumstance. Although this conclusion
will probably not dim the ardor of aggrieved plaintiffs, an attorney
counselling a client about a potential infringement suit should be
aware of this high threshold for plaintiffs' summary judgment.
B. Plaintiff-Responding Party
A plaintiff opposing a motion for summary judgment must con-
vince the court that a genuine issue of material fact exists.76 Plaintiffs
have relied on several techniques to accomplish this task, some related
to the issues and others not.
In the past, plaintiffs sometimes relied on latent or patent judicial
hostility to summary judgment to tip the scales in their favor. This
hostility grew out of the "day in court" philosophy alluded to previ-
ously.7 7 The leading case for plaintiffs opposing summary judgments,
69. 765 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 240-43.
72. 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
73. Id. at 1186-88.
74. Id. at 1183.
75. Id. at 1190.
76. Plaintiffs sometimes have had to accomplish this task at the appellate level. See,
e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990), and Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812
F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987). In both cases, summary judgments for defendants in the district
courts were reversed on appeal.
77. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Arnstein v. Porter,78 held that there should be a trial on the merits if
there was the "slightest doubt as to the facts."79 The doubt in Arnstein
was very slight indeed: the plaintiff alleged that some of Cole Porter's
most popular songs, including "Begin the Beguine," "Night and Day,"
and "You'd Be So Nice To Come Home To," were plagiarized from
plaintiff's "The Lord Is My Shepherd," "A Mother's Prayer," "I Love
You Madly," and "Sadness Overwhelms My Soul."8 The plaintiff fur-
ther accused Porter of planting "stooges" around him and implied that
Porter was somehow involved in several burglaries during which songs
were stolen.8 1 Porter denied any contact with the plaintiff's composi-
tions, some of which were unpublished. The trial judge characterized
the plaintiff's accusations as "fantastic."82 Nevertheless, the appellate
court required a jury trial on both the access and substantial similarity
83issues.
Plaintiffs opposing summary judgments cite Arnstein to support
the proposition that "generally there should be trials in plagiarism
suits."84 Although several early cases so hold,85 judges are much less
likely to agree as court calendars become more crowded and wor-
kloads increase. Only two cases in the 1970s, and none since 1975,
have cited Arnstein on this point with approval.86 Although plaintiffs
will no doubt continue to advance it, Arnstein's "slightest doubt" argu-
ment does not seem to carry much weight with modern courts.
78. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
79. Id. at 468.
80. Id. at 467. "A Mother's Prayer" seems to have been a particularly fertile source;
"Begin the Beguine" and "My Heart Belongs to Daddy" were both alleged to have been
copied from it.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 469.
83. Id. For a description of this plaintiff's previous adventures in court, see ALEXAN-
DER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 193-98 (1952).
84. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 1946).
85. MacDonald v. DuMaurier, 144 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1944) (plaintiff alleged defend-
ant's Rebecca copied from her story); Dezendorf v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 99
F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1938) (unpublished play alleged to be source for film); Solomon v.
R.K.O. Pictures, 40 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (plaintiff alleged defendant's film Radio
City Revels infringed on plaintiff's play It Goes Through Here).
86. Goodson-Todman Enters. v. Kellogg Co., 358 F. Supp. 1245 (C.D. Cal 1973), rev'd,
513 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975) (Tony the Tiger commercial using To Tell the Truth slogan);
Dave Grossman Designs, Inc. v. Bortin, 347 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (infringing
statuary).
The Ninth Circuit's original opinion in Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir.
1987), cited Arnstein on this point. When MCA's counsel protested and asked for a re-
hearing on the grounds that the opinion revived the "slightest doubt" test, the court de-
leted the reference in its amended opinion.
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Plaintiffs have the best chance of success if they pursue two issue-
oriented lines of attack: raising questions of fact about access and
raising questions about substantial similarity itself. Copyright protec-
tion precludes only copying. A plaintiff must thus prove that the de-
fendant had access to his work 87 in order to copy it. If the defendant
arrived at the same place without having seen (or heard) the plaintiff's
work, the plaintiff cannot recover, even if the two works are virtually
identical.88
As access is usually a question of fact, defendants often concede
it in their motions for summary judgment in order to clear the way for
a judgment as a matter of law.89 This decision-whether to concede
access-is a difficult one for defendants, because summary judgment
can occasionally be obtained on this issue alone.' When defendants
do not concede access, plaintiffs have sometimes successfully resisted
motions for summary judgment. The Arnstein court based its reversal
in part on this issue, emphasizing the importance of witness credibility
in determining access. 91 Other courts have likewise refused to grant
summary judgments because witness credibility weighed so heavily. 2
Of course, if the plaintiff can convince a court that the similarities
and differences between the two works are too close to decide as a
matter of law, the court will deny the defendant's motion or will re-
verse the granting of a motion on appeal.93 Since it is now de rigueur
87. 3 NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.02.
88. If the plaintiff cannot show access, his burden on the similarity issue becomes
heavier. He must show "striking similarity" instead of merely "substantial similarity." See,
e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 903 (7th Cir. 1984). Nonetheless, one court refused to
grant summary judgment even in the face of this heavier burden. See Testa v. Janson, 492
F. Supp. 198 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (even though no proof of access, defendant's motion for
summary judgment denied).
89. See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984); Risdon v. Walt Dis-
ney Prods., No. 83 Civ. 6595 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 1984).
90. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Tennille, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 26,267 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), and cases cited infra at notes 148-55.
91. 154 F.2d at 469-70 (2d Cir. 1946).
92. Sanford v. CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 711, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (plaintiff alleged
Michael Jackson copied his song; issue of access, witness credibility); Nordstrom v. Radio
Corp. of Am., 251 F. Supp. 41 (D. Colo. 1965) (musical compositions; credibility issue).
93. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (Equalizer script
and pilot script for television show Equalizer could be substantially similar); Baxter v.
MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987) (reasonable minds could differ as to whether
the theme from E.T. copied plaintiffs song "Joy"; no "bright line" determines how much
similarity is permissible); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327
(9th Cir. 1983) (Star Wars and Battlestar Galactica too similar for summary judgment);
Blumcraft of Pittsburg v. Newman Bros., 373 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1967) (ornamental hand
railings); Morgan Creek Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1881 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (similarities between the movie Young Guns and the TV show Young
Riders triable); Trousseau Monogram Corp. v. Saturday Knight, Ltd., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
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to submit the properties at issue to the court in conjunction with the
motion, the court has its own opportunity to compare them. To assist
the court in its determination, plaintiffs have relied on two instruc-
tional aids, both of which can backfire if used imprudently: expert tes-
timony and list of similarities.
Expert testimony will be discussed in more detail subsequently.94
It is only necessary to note here one advantage and one disadvantage
of its use. Regardless of its substance, expert testimony may be used
successfully if the moving party's papers included such testimony. If
the opposing party produces experts with contrary opinions, the court
may deny a motion for summary judgment, believing that differences
of opinion between experts must be resolved by a jury.95 Expert testi-
mony can work against the non-moving plaintiff, however, if the court
uses the Krofft test for substantial similarity.96 Several courts have
expressed more than a little irritation at long-winded and arcane anal-
yses, and the Krofft court held this kind of advice inappropriate in
(BNA) 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (red rose on satin strip on towels); Branch v. Ogilvie &
Mather, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (cookbooks); Schiller & Schmidt,
Inc. v. Wallace Computer Serv., Inc., No 85 C 4415, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13974 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 20, 1989) (office supply catalogues); Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353
(N.D. I11. 1989) (silent airline commercials); Heyman v. Rublowsky, 743 F. Supp. 190
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (issue of similarity between opera backdrop and photo triable); Barris/
Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1887 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(triable issue of fact whether TV game show Bamboozle similar to To Tell The Truth);
Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc., v. 20/20 Advertising, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671 (D. Minn.
1987) (similarity between audio-visual aspects of two commercials using same actress tria-
ble); Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (photographs);
Walt Disney Prods., v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (similarities
between animated films must be tried); Ruolo v. Russ Berrie & Co., No. 82 C 2668, 1987
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2557 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1987) (similarities between greeting card lines
must be tried); Ekern v. Sew/Fit Co., 622 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (similarity between
five illustrations and supporting text in sewing manuals created triable issue of fact); Litoff
v. American Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (jewelry designs); Knicker-
bocker Toy Co. v. Winterbrook Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.H. 1982) (competing Rag-
gedy Ann dolls); Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (issue about whether
only one way to express idea); Malkin v. Dubinsky, 146 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (play
and movie about union organizing); Kurlan v. CBS, 256 P.2d 962 (1953) (radio program's
format might infringe other program).
94. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Levine v. McDonald's Corp., 735 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), in which a
summary judgment motion regarding the similarity between plaintiff's "patter" technique
song and a McDonald's commercial became a battle of the experts. Defendants' summary
judgment motion was denied.
In at least one case, however, defendants' experts so outshone plaintiffs expert that
the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment largely on the strength of
their declarations. Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 972 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1992).
96. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977). See infra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
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applying the "intrinsic" test for infringement.97 A judge faced with
reams of expert prose may conclude that his time is being wasted and
perhaps that he is being patronized.
The list of similarities that plaintiffs inevitably submit to direct
the court's attention to bases of infringement must be compiled with
extreme caution. A bad list is worse than no list at all. A bad list
compares widely scattered details, rearranges the components of the
works to give a false sense of sequence, and isolates insignificant re-
semblances, elevating them into major factors.98 Few documents in a
copyright suit provoke more judicial ire than a list of similarities that,
in effect, insults the court's intelligence. 99
One defensive tactic that, although successful, cannot be recom-
mended is reported in Allen v. Suskind.1° In that case, the judge de-
nied a motion for summary judgment because of discrepancies
between the plaintiff's affidavit and his deposition. Although expres-
sing his strong disapproval of this state of affairs, the judge nonethe-
less perceived an issue of fact about whether the plaintiff had invented
certain passages or quoted them. It is not likely that this situation will
be imitated, especially because it required a determination of which of
plaintiff's sworn statements was false.
In another unusual case, the defendant moved for summary judg-
ment on the issue of the validity of plaintiff's copyright of a design on
women's clothing, claiming that the copyright was invalid because
plaintiff had copied its design from another designer. 1 1 This tactic
placed plaintiff in the position usually reserved for a defendant-try-
ing to prove that its design was not substantially similar to another's
design. The district court ruled that plaintiff did not have a valid copy-
right in the design because it had been copied from another source.0 2
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the issue of plaintiff's origi-
nality, and therefore the validity of its copyright, must be tried.0 3
97. Id. at 1164. See also Nichols v. Universal Picture Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir.
1930) (Judge Learned Hand criticized expert witness used in trial court and expert testi-
mony in general).
98. See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984); Nash v. CBS,
Inc., 704 F. Supp. 823, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Silva v. MacLaine, 697 F. Supp. 1423, 1428
(E.D. Mich. 1988); Overman v. Universal City Studios, 605 F. Supp. 350, 353 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
99. See, e.g., Costello v. Loew's, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 782, 788 (D.D.C. 1958).
100. Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,471 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1982).
101. North Coast Indus. v. Jason-Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1992).




The defendant trying to resist a motion for summary judgment
faces the same task as the plaintiff.1°4 He must convince the court that
a trial is required to resolve a genuine issue of material fact. Thus,
defendants have tried to raise the same factual issues that opposing
plaintiffs raise, particularly those such as access, which call for a trier
of fact to evaluate witness credibility. 0 5
Defendants have also successfully resisted summary judgments at
the appeals level. In each case, the appellate court held that the trial
court had not properly distinguished between different kinds of
works. As Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co." 6 established, if an
idea can be expressed in only a few ways, then allowing the expression
to be copyrighted would be tantamount to permitting the copyrighting
of an idea. TWo courts reversed summary judgments granted to plain-
tiffs on this principle. One case involved wall charts showing how to
use weight-lifting equipment; 10 7 the other a book on how to win at
Scrabble. 108 In both instances, the courts found that ways of expres-
sing the ideas were so limited that greater similarity would have to be
tolerated to avoid copyrighting the idea.
D. Defendant-Moving Party
An attorney who likes to have the odds in his or her favor will
move for summary judgment on behalf of a defendant. Of the cases
reviewed, victories for moving defendants constitute more than all
other victories combined.
104. Sometimes the plaintiff and the defendant make cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, only to have them both denied on the same grounds-triable issues of fact. See, e.g.,
Heyman v. Salle, 743 F. Supp. 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
105. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogarty, 664 F. Supp. 1345, 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (reasonable
minds could differ as to whether two songs written by John Fogarty were substantially
similar); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982) (court
cannot direct verdict, so summary judgment inappropriate); Knickerbocker Toy Co. v.
Buddy L Corp., 547 F. Supp. 35, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (toy "wrist racers"; access issue);
Harris v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 390, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (magazine arti-
cles about Elizabeth Taylor; "slightest doubt" test used); C.S. Hammond & Co. v. Interna-
tional College Globe Inc., 146 F. Supp. 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (inflatable globes; witness
credibility issue).
106. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
107. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 863 (1975).
108. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.
1984).
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1. Idea/Expression Dichotomy
When a defendant moves for summary judgment, similar ele-
ments usually appear somewhere in both works. Defendants never-
theless often prevail. The theories employed in a successful
defendant's motion are but variations on one theme: copyright pro-
tection extends only to protectable expression.10 9
a. Ideas Not Protectable
The desire to keep ideas free of copyright monopoly has been
expressed in several ways. The court may flatly find, as it did in Musto
v. Meyer, 10 that the defendant copied the plaintiff's ideas, not his ex-
pression. In Musto, the plaintiff had published an article in a medical
journal on Sherlock Holmes, Sigmund Freud, and cocaine. The paper
gave the history of nineteenth-century cocaine use and speculated,
tongue in cheek, that Sherlock Holmes' mysterious disappearance
could be due to his being treated for cocaine addiction. No less a
personage than Freud, himself fascinated by cocaine, would have been
his therapist. Six years later, defendants published a book, The 7%
Solution, and released a movie by the same name shortly thereafter.
Drawing heavily on Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's stories, the book pur-
ported to be a newly discovered Watson manuscript. It told of
Holmes's overuse of cocaine, his resulting paranoia about Professor
Moriarity, and a ruse whereby Watson induces Holmes to travel to
Vienna. In Vienna, Freud cures Holmes of his addiction, and Holmes
suggests to Freud deductive techniques that Freud might profitably
employ in psychoanalysis. Together Freud and Holmes solve a mys-
tery, using a combination of detective ability and psychoanalytic in-
sight. The court held that the defendants had copied only the
plaintiff's idea, not his expression."'
[T]he similarity between the article and the book is limited to the
idea that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle misled the reading public in The
Final Problem as to the real activities of Sherlock Holmes in Central
Europe, that Holmes was really addicted to cocaine at the time, and
that Holmes' friend, Watson, tricked Holmes into following Profes-
sor Moriarity to Vienna so that he could be cured of his habit by
Sigmund Freud. 12
109. The other theme in these cases is the burden on the plaintiff to make some show-
ing of access. See infra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
110. 434 F. Supp. 32, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
111. The court also appeared to be influenced by the heavy use both works had made of
a common source, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's stories, the pertinent parts of which were by
then in the public domain. Id.
112. Id. at 36-37. The plaintiff isolated eight elements common to his article and the
book. The court conceded that "certain elements" appeared in both (without saying which
19931
b. Similarities Only in Factual Expression
A court may also find that the similarities involve information
that is non-protectable. 113 These include historical or biographical
or how many), yet held for defendant. See also Brown Bag Software v. Symantic Corp.,
960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992) (outlining computer programs similar in non-protect-
able ideas); Banker's Promotional Mktg. Group v. Orange, 926 F.2d 704, 705 (8th Cir.
1992) (home buying "How To" guides were not substantially similar); Frybarger v. IBM
Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1987) (videogames); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
833 F.2d 117, 121 (8th Cir. 1987) (Rainbow Brite similar to plaintiff's Rainbow Island only
in ideas); Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc., 739 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir.
1984) (drawings for building; cannot copyright idea of tower with structure on top); Coston
v. Product Movers, No. 89-4865, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5203 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1990) (idea
of Advent calendar not protectable); Falotico v. WPVI-Channel 6, No. 89-5175, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14094 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 1989) (defendant's news story about South Philly
similar to plaintiff's script only in ideas); Cosgrove v. Warner Bros., Inc., No. 88-0999, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3793 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1989) (plaintiff's book similar to Ladyhawke
only in themes and ideas); Green v. Proctor & Gamble, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 418, 421(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (toothpaste commercials similar only in ideas); Glanzman v. King, No. 88-
CV-70491-DT, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15705 (E.D. Aug. 28, Mich. 1988) (Stephen King
novel Christine similar to plaintiff's "The Side Swiper" only in basic idea of car running
over people); Silva v. MacLaine 697 F. Supp. 1423, 1430 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (Out on a Limb
similar to Date with the Gods in ideas); Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813,
817 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (Snorkie Snorkel not similar to the Snorks); Selmon v. Hasbro Brad-
ley, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1267, 1271 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (products similar in idea of combining
characteristics of different animals into one animal); Cory Van Rijn, Inc. v. California Rai-
sin Advisory Bd., 697 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 1987) ("Raisin People" similar to
Claymation raisins only in idea of animated raisins); Arthur v. American Broadcasting Co.,
633 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (ABC/Olympic logo similar to plaintiff's sculpture
only in idea); Zambito v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1107, 1110 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (Raiders of the Lost Ark not similar in protectable expression to plaintiff's work);
Perma Greeting, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 598 F. Supp. 445, 448 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (slogans
and artwork on mugs similar only in idea); Risdon v. Walt Disney Prods., No. 83 Civ. 6595,
slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 1984) (author of unpublished futuristic screen play about com-
puter-controlled society similar to defendants' Tron only in idea); Smith v. Weinstein, 578
F. Supp. 1297, 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Stir Crazy similar to plaintiff's treatments and scripts
about prison rodeo only on the level of uncopyrightable ideas); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d
141, 142 (9th Cir. 1983) (plays about acting similar only in non-copyrightable ideas); Gian-
grasso v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 472, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (plain-
tiff's script similar only in ideas to episode of WKRP in Cincinnati); McMahon v. Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (similarities of ideas and concepts in
psychology textbook not copyrightable); Gibson v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 491
F. Supp. 583, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (skit about white and yolk of an egg did not infringe
plaintiff's "lecture" "I Am AND [sic] EGG").
113. A recent United States Supreme Court opinion has reaffirmed the non-protectable
nature of facts, although not in the context of substantial similarity of copyrightable ex-
pression. "The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of
the work may be protected. Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly,
copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to
the author." Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). Noting
that "copyright requires originality .... [and] facts are never original," id. at 360, the Court
explained that "facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one
between creation and discovery: the first person to find and report a fact has not created
the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence." Id. at 347.
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facts and events. In Fuld v. National Broadcasting Co.,114 the court
compared the plaintiff's unpublished script on the life of gangster
Bugsy Siegel with the defendant's television movie, The Virginia Hill
Story. The plaintiff listed eighteen points of similarity which the court
cut down to eleven, because the remaining seven occurred only in the
script, not in the movie as it was broadcast. The defendant countered
with a list of biographical sources for Siegel's life. The court held,
"[I]t is impossible to copyright historical facts or fictional material
previously published by others.""' 5
Similarly, the court in Alexander v. Haley1 6 held that similarities
between the plaintiff's book Jubilee and the defendant's famous
Roots, both about American slaves, derived in part from historical
fact. "No claim of copyright protection can arise from the fact that
plaintiff has written about such historical and factual items, even if we
are to assume that Haley was alerted to the facts in question by read-
ing Jubilee.""' 7 The court also held that "material traceable to com-
mon sources, the public domain or folk custom" is not protectable. 18
114, 390 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
115. Id. at 882. See also Norman v. CBS, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 788,796-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
116. 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
117. Id. at 45.
118. Id. See also Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989) (factual similarities
between books about San Francisco Jewish community); Worth v. Selchow & Richter Co.,
827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988) (factual similarities between
Trivial Pursuit and book about trivia); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986) (similarities between two "Fort Apache" works due to
historical facts); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (similarities in accounts of Hindenburg disaster due to elements
taken from historical sources); Ferguson v. NBC, 584 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1978) (two songs
had precursors in Bach composition); Sabin v. Regardie, Regardie & Barstow, 770 F. Supp.
5 (D.D.C. 1991) (real estate guides deal with factual matters); Russell v. Turnabaugh, 774
F. Supp. 597 (D. Colo. 1991) (factual similarities between newspaper articles); Black's
Guide, Inc. v. MediAmerica, Inc., No. C-90-0819, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16272 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 15, 1990) (guides to leasing office space in San Francisco similar in factual elements);
National Presto Indus., Inc. v. Hamilton Beach, Inc., No. 88 C 10567, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4288 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 1990) (shredder packaging and manuals similar in factual
elements); Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Colo. 1988) (book and video-
tape about Colorado ski resorts similar in facts); Silva v. MacLaine, 697 F. Supp. 1423
(E.D. Mich. 1988) (two books about paranormal experiences similar in facts); McCall v.
Johnson Publishing Co., 680 F. Supp. 46 (D.D.C. 1988) (two books about finding men
similar in factual advice); Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (work contain-
ing similar facts and quotations as other work); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp.,
568 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (similarities between two pinball games found only in
non-copyrightable game elements); Tompkins Graphics, Inc. v. Zipatone, Inc., Copyright
L. Rep. (CCH) 25,698 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 1983) (geometric shapes not copyrightable);
Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (book and biography of the
Rosenbergs similar because both recount factual events); International Luggage Registry
v. Avery Prods., 184 U.S.P.Q. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (copyrightable portions of luggage labels
not similar), vacated, 541 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1976); Herbert Rosenthal Jewel Corp. v. Ho-
1993]
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c. Scdne d Faire
Scdne d faire as a term of copyright art was adopted by Judge
Yankwich in Schwartz v. Universal Pictures"9 as "a very expressive
[French] phrase in dramatic literature." He defined it as a "scene that
'must' be done" and gave as an example a play in which Adolphe
Menjou spilled some red ink and wiped it off with a handkerchief.
The scdne d faire involving the red spot on the handkerchief then be-
came inevitable. 2 °
This principle of economy, which allows an author to convey an
idea with little explanation, extends beyond plays, of course, and is
usually expected as part of a work's unity. That is, although life itself
abounds with dead and loose ends, art is more tidily fashioned, and
each detail is purposely chosen to contribute to the whole. Deviations
from this principle receive either praise or blame, depending on
whether critics think the author deviated intentionally, to imitate life
more closely, or absentmindedly, because he forgot.
From this humble and restricted beginning, scdne J faire has
grown into a formidable barrier to copyright infringement actions. It
now has two definitions, neither of which exactly parallels Judge
Yankwich's original formulation. Scdne d faire now refers to (1) stan-
dard or "stock" characters, episodes, and incidents,' 2' or (2) elements
that inevitably arise in the treatment of a certain theme, situation, or
setting.' 22 Thus, no Western would be complete without a black-hat-
ted villain, a tall-in-the-saddle good guy, a shootout, and a ride off into
the sunset. A "spring break" movie will reliably feature hordes of
scantily clad bathing beauties, beer-guzzling college boys, and such
well-worn plot devices as the couple who manages to find true love
nora Jewelry Co. Inc., 378 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 509 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1974) (jew-
eled turtle pins similar in uncopyrightable design of turtle); Gethers v. Blatty, 283 F. Supp.
303 (C.D. Cal 1968) (play and novel similar only in non-protectable military setting); Cos-
tello v. Loew's, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 782 (D.D.C. 1958) (drama and movie about Arthurian
legend similar in elements from common, public domain sources such as Mallory's Morte
d'Arthur); Caruthers v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (ele-
ments common to plaintiff's unpublished manuscript and movie, Cimarron, traceable to
historical events); Ornstein v. Paramount Prods. Inc., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (com-
mon plot or theme accounts for similarities between play and movie about wife who prosti-
tutes herself to pay for husband's medical care); Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1932) (opera, U.S.A. with Music, similar to satire, Of Thee I Sing, only in ele-
ments already in public domain).
119. 85 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983); Hoehling v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
122. See, e.g., Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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amid the general frenzy. This is not exactly what Judge Yankwich, or
the French, had in mind.
The similarities between the two works involved in Alexander v.
Haley were held non-infringing as scines d faire.123 As that court de-
fined it, sc6nes d faire means "incidents, characters, or settings which
are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the
treatment of a given topic."' 24 The court identified "[a]ttempted es-
capes, flights through the woods pursued by baying dogs, the sorrow-
ful or happy singing of slaves, the atrocity of the buying and selling of
human beings,"' 25 as well as "scenes portraying sex between male
slaveowners and female slaves and the resentment of the female slave-
owners... ; the sale of a slave child away from her family.. .[;] puni-
tive mutilation... ; and slaveowners complaining about the high price
of slaves' 1 26 as scenes d faire connected with the American slave
experience.
In Davis v. United Artists Inc.,27 the author of the book Coming
Home sued the makers of a film by the same name. In granting a
summary judgment to the defendants, the court ruled that those simi-
larities not "strained" or "insignificant" flowed from "a sequence of
events which necessarily follow from a common theme, in this in-
stance, elements that are common in any story about the Vietnam
War.' 28 The court gave as an example the "stock" figure of a patri-
otic soldier whose war experience confuses his values. 129
123. 460 F. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 45.
126. Id. at 45 n.7.
127. 547 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
128. Id. at 727.
129. Id. See also Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986) (similarities
in "Fort Apache" properties attributable to scdnes 4 faire); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141
(9th Cir. 1983) (plays about acting similar only in scenes d faire); Hoehling v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (similarities in
accounts of Hindenburg disaster due in part to scines d faire); Black v. Gosdin, 740 F.
Supp. 1288 (D. Tenn. 1990) (similarity of country music lyrics attributable to "stock"
themes); Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Colo. 1988) (book and videotape
about Colorado ski resorts similar in scenes 4 faire); Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F.
Supp. 46 (D.D.C. 1988) (Snorkie Snorkel similar to The Snorks in underwater scines d
faire); Wavelength Film Co. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. I11.
1986) (Starman similar to plaintiff's work in scdnes d faire of alien's visit to Earth); Hart-
man v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (Rainbow Brite and Rain-
bow Island similar in sc~nes d faire); Overman v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 605 F. Supp.
350 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (author's screenplay similar to movie Bustin' Loose in unprotectable
scdnes d faire); Giangrasso v. CBS, 534 F. Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (screenplay and epi-
sode of WKRP in Cincinnati similar in scines d faire); Midwood v. Paramount Picture
Corp., Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,292 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1981) (movie Posse similar to
plaintiffs short story The Sheriff only in scdnes d faire); Reyher v. Children's Television
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Defendant's counsel will thus often try to show that the similari-
ties between two properties arise not from copying, but from the fact
that the two works belong to the same genre or that they both treat
the same theme. To permit copyright protection of elements belong-
ing to the genre or theme would effectively deliver them into one per-
son's hands. This defense has proven very successful. 130
d. Limited Way to Formulate Statement
Defendants have also prevailed in cases involving factual state-
ments if they can show that the forms of expression for an idea are so
limited that allowing the plaintiff to copyright the expression effec-
tively allows him to copyright the idea. In Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble Co.,131 the plaintiff claimed the defendant's contest rules in-
fringed his rules for a sale promotion contest. Although the two sets
of rules were nearly identical, the appeals court upheld defendant's
summary judgment because "to permit copyrighting would mean that
a party.., by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all
possibilities of future use of the substance."' 32 The court in Con-
sumer's Union v. Hobart Mfg. Co.133 granted the defendant's summary
judgment motion on copyright infringement even though the defend-
ant copied part of the magazine article about its dishwasher and dis-
tributed it in a sales bulletin. This court reasoned that such purely
factual statements could not be otherwise expressed. 34
Workshop, 387 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 980 (1976) (similarities between stories about child losing and finding mother due to
scdnes d faire); Fuld v. NBC, 390 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (similarities between two
accounts of gangster Bugsy Siegel due partly to common theme); Bevan v. CBS, 329 F.
Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (similarities between Stalag 17 and Hogan's Heroes attributable
to sc~nes d faire).
130. One notable exception involved the suit between the makers of Star Wars and
Battlestar Galactica. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th
Cir. 1983). Counsel for defendants prepared a short videotape of clips from other science
fiction films in an effort to show that the similarities between the disputed works had their
origins in the science fiction genre to which both belonged. The defendants won a sum-
mary judgment in the trial court, but the Ninth Circuit, after viewing the same videotape,
reversed.
131. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
132. Id. at 678.
133. 199 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
134. Id. at 861. See also Cooling Sys. and Flexibles, Inc., v. Stuart Radiator, 777 F.2d
485 (9th Cir. 1985) (radiator catalogues); Decorative Aides Corp. v. Staple Sewing Aides
Corp., 497 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 657 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1981) (similar instruc-
tion sheets).
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e. Idea Equivalent to Expression
Close imitation will also be permitted when the idea and the ex-
pression of the idea are virtually indistinguishable. The cases in this
category deal uniformly with physical objects: jewelry and toys are
the most popular subjects for these motions. For example, a court will
refuse to permit a case to go to the jury if the plaintiff's only com-
plaint is that the defendant is marketing a teddy bear that is similar to
plaintiff's in the way that all teddy bears resemble each other. Again,
the rationale behind such rulings is to prevent a manufacturer from
monopolizing the marketplace by claiming rights to elements of ex-
pression that are not original.135
f. No-Reasonable-Jury Test
In some cases, courts have granted and affirmed defendants' sum-
mary judgment motions because "no reasonable jury, properly in-
structed, could find the two works are substantially similar.' 1 36 This is
an extremely vague formulation, and in most cases a court will refer to
some concrete elements of the two works to indicate the basis of the
opinion.
In Warner Brothers v. ABC,137 the court compared the Superman
character from movies, television, and comic books with Ralph Hink-
ley, the main character of the television sitcom, The Greatest Ameri-
can Hero.138 The court did not focus on any particular variant of the
idea/expression dichotomy. Instead, it concentrated on the difference
in tone between the two characters.
Superman looks and acts like a brave, proud hero, who has dedi-
cated his life to combating the forces of evil. Hinkley looks and acts
like a timid, reluctant hero, who accepts his missions grudgingly and
prefers to get on with his normal life. Superman performs his super-
human feats with skill, verve, and dash, clearly master of his own
destiny. Hinkley is perplexed by the superhuman powers his cos-
tume confers and uses them in a bumbling, comical fashion. 139
135. Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1991) (Man-in-the-Moon
masks); Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987) (stuffed animal
heads); Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987) (dinosaur dolls); North Am.
Bear Co. v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., No. 91 C 4550, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17350 (N.D.
I11. Nov. 26, 1991) (stuffed bears); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 353
(S.D. Tex. 1991) (maps); Gentieu v. John Muller & Co., 712 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
(photographs of babies); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Schaifer Nance & Co,,
679 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (bears and Cabbage Patch Kids; declaratory relief
action).
136. Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 231.
139. Id. at 243.
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Thus, even though the television show clearly linked Hinkley with Su-
perman through the use of familiar phrases, superhuman abilities, and
a costume similar in style, though not in color, to Superman's, the
court found that no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity
between the characters. 140
In another case, an appellate court affirmed the defendant's sum-
mary judgment, holding that two plays, Fear of Acting and The Actor's
Nightmare, were not substantially similar.141  The court referred
briefly to scene d faire but concentrated mainly on the individual simi-
larities identified by the plaintiff. Both the trial and the appellate
courts concluded that "no reasonable trier of fact could find the two
plays to be substantially similar.' ' 42
140. The Warner Bros. court also ruled that survey results submitted by the plaintiff to
show general audience reaction to the two characters not admissible evidence. This seems
to cast doubt on the "ordinary observer" test, see supra note 30 and accompanying text, if a
court will not admit "survey evidence indicating that some people applying some standard
of their own were reminded of one work by the other." Id. at 245. It is difficult to imagine
what standard ordinary observers could have applied, other than their reactions.
141. See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1983).
142. Id. at 143. See also Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1991) (no
reasonable jury would find similarities between two "Man in the Moon" masks); Banker's
Promotional Mktg. Group v. Orange, 926 F.2d 704 (8th Cir. 1991) (reasonable person
would not find similarities between real estate selling guides); Nelson v. PRN Prods., Inc.,
873 F.2d 1141 (8th Cir. 1989) (no reasonable person would perceive Prince song to be like
plaintiff's); Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, 814 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1987) (Michigan ad cam-
paigns not similar to reasonable jury); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1985)
(Coma movie not similar to plaintiff's screen treatment); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (no lay observer would recognize E. T. as a dramatization of plaintiff's
play); O'Neill v. Dell Publishing Co., 630 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1980) (only remote semblance
of ideas between stories of vanishing and reappearing submarines); Jones v. CBS, Inc., 733
F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (plaintiff's treatment of Peachtree Street not similar to TV
show Frank's Place); Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (no reasonable jury would find He-Man doll similar to Conan doll); Green v. Proctor
& Gamble, Inc., 709 F.- Supp. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (no reasonable jury would find tooth-
paste commercials similar); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. III. 1989) (Simon &
Simon TV episode not similar to plaintiff's book on Dillinger); McCall v. Johnson Publish-
ing Co., 680 F. Supp. 46 (D.D.C. 1988) (no reasonable jury would find similarities between
two advice books on how to get a man); Friedman v. ITC International Television Corp.,
644 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (biography of Disraeli not similar to television show);
Anderson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (no reasonable jury
would find Trading Places similar to plaintiffs High Stakes); Pelligrino v. American Greet-
ing Corp., 592 F. Supp. 450 (D.S.D. 1984) (ordinary observer would find no similarities
between cartoon Ziggy and character in plaintiff's book); Overman v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 350 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (reasonable jury would not find similarities
between movie Bustin' Loose and plaintiff's Easy Money); Gethers v. Blatty, 283 F. Supp.
303 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (ordinary observer would not find similarity between play and novel
set in military rehabilitation center); Land v. Jerry Lewis Prods., Inc. 140 U.S.P.Q. 351
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1964) (no reasonable similarity between plaintiff's screenplay and The
Nutty Professor motion picture); Buckler v. Paramount Pictures, 133 F. Supp. 223
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g. De Minimis Copying
Courts will also grant summary judgment if the similarities be-
tween plaintiff's and defendant's works consist only of an insignificant
number of words or phrases, especially if the words and phrases are
commonplace expressions. Thus, in Narell v. Freeman,43 the court
found that the coincidence of a few phrases, such as a riverbank
"crawling with alligators," was so unremarkable that copying could
not be inferred from it.144
2. Access
The plaintiff's required showing of access stems from a principle
different from protecting only copyrightable expression. Copyright
protection precludes only copying. If two people arrive at the same
result independently, copyright law will not protect the first. 45 Since
direct evidence of copying is ordinarily not available, courts permit
plaintiffs to prove copying by showing access. 146 Thus, if the plaintiff's
work was available to the defendant and the two works are substan-
tially similar, a trier of fact may find copying without direct proof.
The other side of the access issue for defendants is independent
creation. That is, if the defendant can demonstrate to the court's satis-
faction that its work was created without reference to plaintiff's work,
the court will grant summary judgment to defendant. 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (no reasonable person could find similarities between plaintiff's unpub-
lished play and Sunset Boulevard).
Two courts engaged in an unusual weighing process and granted defendants' summary
judgment motions because the differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' work out-
weighed the similarities. Dugan v. ABC, 216 F. Supp. 763 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (television
game shows); Shipman v. R.K.O. Pictures, 20 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), affd, 100 F.2d
533 (2d Cir. 1938) (play and movie about successful woman who gives up career for
husband).
After finding nothing similar in plot, theme, character or language between two plays,
another judge ruled for the defendant, stating that he had not the "'slightest doubt' that
the plaintiff's claim is the product of nothing but hope that, to avoid the expense and
irritation of litigation, the owner of a successful play would buy his peace." Millstein v.
Leland Hayward, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 198, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
143. 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989).
144. Id. at 911. See also Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 770 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
affd, 970 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1992); McDonald v. Multimedia Entertainment, Inc., 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10649 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (similarity of one note in two songs); Siskind v.
Newton-John, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 26,133 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (similarity between two
songs' lyrics only in commonplace phrases).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 87-92.
146. See, e.g., Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); 3 NIMMER, supra note
30, § 13.02.
147. Novak v. NBC Inc., 752 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (evidence of genesis of Sat-
urday Night Live skits showed independent creation); Siskind v. Newton-John, No. 84 Civ.
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Although defendants will often concede access to remove what
may be a question of fact from a summary judgment motion, defend-
ants have occasionally won summary judgments on this issue. Access
has been defined in two ways: actual viewing of plaintiff's work 148 or,
now more widely accepted, a "reasonable opportunity" to view it.149
Proof of access frequently turns on credibility, since defendants usu-
ally deny ever having seen the infringed work. If credibility is an im-
portant factor, summary judgment cannot be obtained. 5 °
Plaintiffs must show more than the "bare possibility" of access
and failure to produce some evidence on this point may lead to a sum-
mary judgment for defendants.'' In Jason v. Fonda,152 the plaintiff's
book, from which she alleged the movie Coming Home was taken, was
printed in 1974 and had an extremely limited circulation. She had
submitted it to United Artists in 1977, after the film was nearly com-
pleted. The court concluded that "the level of availability creates no
more than a 'bare possibility' that defendants may have had access to
plaintiff's book. In and of itself, such a bare possibility is insufficient
to create a genuine issue of whether defendants copied plaintiff's
book.' 5 3 In another case, the only evidence plaintiff could offer on
defendant's access was the defendant's presence in Washington, D.C.
when a copy of the plaintiff's song reposed in the Library of Con-
gress. 54 This was held to be insufficient.'55
Thus, defendant's counsel should consider carefully before con-
ceding access. If plaintiff contests this issue, an adverse ruling may
preclude summary judgment altogether. If, however, the plaintiff's
work is sufficiently obscure, a defendant may obtain summary judg-
2634, 1987 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4084 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1987) (two songs independently
created).
148. Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
149. Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 3 NIMMER,
supra note 30, § 13.02.
150. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
151. Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 776 (C.D Cal. 1981), affd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir.
1982).
152. 526 F. Supp. 774.
153. Id. at 776-77.
154. Higgins v. Woroner Prod., Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. 384 (S.D. Fla. 1969). See also Fergu-
son v. NBC Inc., 584 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff could not show that defendant
composer of television song had access to her music); Meta-Film Assocs., Inc. v. MCA,
Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (makers of Animal House did not have access to
plaintiff's Frat Rat); Majarian v. Tobias, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,595 (D. Mass. Oct.
20, 1983) (no access between defendant and plaintiffs book on insurance); Roberts v.
Dahl, 168 U.S.P.Q. 428 (I11. Cir. Ct. 1971), affd, 286 N.E.2d 51 (1972) (no access to plain-
tiff's unpublished script for television show on beauty care).
155. Higgins v. Woroner Prod., Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. 384.
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ment on this issue alone, without reaching the much trickier question
of substantial similarity.
H
A Suggested Analytical Method to Determine
Substantial Similarity
What may be concluded from this survey? The most obvious con-
clusion is that the pious intonation that frequently opens the discus-
sion of the law in many summary judgment opinions-that summary
judgment is not favored in copyright actions on the issue of substantial
similarity' 56-is flatly wrong. On the contrary, summary judgment is
overwhelmingly favored on this issue, at least in the reported deci-
sions, and especially where defendants are moving parties. Any hesi-
tation that a party might feel in bringing such a motion, or that a court
might feel in granting it on this account, therefore, should be immedi-
ately disregarded.
The large percentage of cases granting summary judgments to de-
fendants reveals a distinct factual pattern: an unknown author sues a
studio, a famous writer, or a famous star (or all three) for "copying"
his work in a well-known movie, television show, or book claiming, "I
wrote ....",1 The dismissal of these suits accounts not only for the
vast majority of the summary judgment motions granted to defendants
but also for the vast majority of summary judgment motions granted
to any party on the issue of substantial similarity.
The prevalence of this pattern in the reported opinions suggests
that something is out of kilter. Either defense counsel choose the
cases that they subject to this test with extreme care and supernatural
good fortune, or the law in its present state permits and even encour-
ages the filing of non-meritorious suits. Summary judgment may to
some extent stand guard at the threshold, since it obviates the need
for a full-dress trial. But because Rule 56 permits, and almost re-
quires, extensive discovery, 158 even a successful motion remains a very
expensive proposition.
156. See, e.g., Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
826 (1985); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1052 (1985).
157. See, e.g., Litchfield, 736 F.2d 1352 ("I wrote E.T."); Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp.
774 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982) ("I wrote Coming Home."); Davis
v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("I also wrote Coming Home.");
Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("I wrote Roots.").
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e), (f).
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Given. the vigor with which insurance companies now defend the
major studios and publishing houses,159 the genuine, cold-blooded
strike suit probably represents a minority of cases. The typical plain-
tiff whose infringement action is dismissed on summary judgment is
instead someone whom success has eluded, who has poured not only
time and energy but considerable self-worth into his work, and who
consequently suffers from "that obsessive conviction, so frequent
among authors and composers, that all similarities between their
works and any others which appear later must invariably be ascribed
to plagiarism."' 6 °
One fundamental problem may be the connotation of the word
"copying" when used in ordinary conversation. To those unfamiliar
with copyright law-a group that includes many attorneys-"copying"
is an action that is offensive in itself, regardless of what is copied.
"Copying" is what happened in school when the student next to you
leaned over during a test to look at your answers, then put them down
as his answers. The offense was not that he appropriated your original
expression; it was that you, presumably, studied for the test while he
did not, yet both received the same grade. 61
This concept of copying appears to animate both plaintiffs and,
sometimes, juries. That is, if a jury can be convinced that a defendant
peeked at plaintiff's work, it may find liability even if the only similari-
ties between the two works are non-protectable ideas, scenes d faire,
or facts.' 62 Many plaintiffs base their suits on the premise that if the
defendants had some access to their works, liability for copyright in-
fringement is virtually guaranteed. Often such plaintiffs simply can-
not understand the difference between an idea and its expression,
159. Rosen, supra note 32, at 1.
160. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612, 613 (2d Cir. 1945).
161. One way to remedy this confusion between ordinary and legal "copying" among
attorneys might be to require a short course in copyright law, perhaps incorporated into a
traditional first-year course like torts or property. Although students are often thoroughly
instructed in the niceties of such subjects as jurisdiction and conflicts of law in law school,
they receive no training in intellectual property unless they take a special class. Most law-
yers in civil practice will encounter at least one copyright issue in the course of their ca-
reers; they could be instructed in the basic principles in a half-dozen sessions.
162. See, e.g., Olson v. NBC, 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988) (disagreed with by Shaw v.
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990)), in which a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
for defendant NBC was affirmed after the jury found that NBC had "copied" plaintiff's
work.
This understanding of "copying" probably also accounts for the long life of the "sweat
of the brow" theory of copyright infringement, put to rest by the Supreme Court in Feist
Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Under this theory, labor in com-
piling information was rewarded with copyright protection, regardless of the originality
involved in assembling the admittedly uncopyrightable information that went into the
compilation.
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between trivial detail and central feature. To them it's all of a piece,
and it's all theirs.
Obviously the courts would benefit from some means of stopping
such plaintiffs from bringing essentially the same suit over and over
again. Given, however, the typical plaintiff's idge fixe, nothing any
judge says from the bench will otherwise persuade an author who,
having written a novel or a script about a torrid romance in Brazil,
now believes that torrid romances, and even Brazil, belong to him.
The way to stop suits that have no business being filed is to shift the
burden of defending them onto the plaintiff and perhaps onto their
attorneys, who presumably can read the opinions and the properties
more objectively. 16 3
Before any burden-shifting can fairly take place, however, clearer
outlines of the criteria for determining substantial similarity of pro-
tectable expression must be developed. The main problem with sum-
mary judgment decisions in this area is their ad hoc character. Of
course, as Learned Hand pointed out long ago, to some extent this
comes with the territory. 6" Courts have, however, simply resigned
themselves to repeating the same formulae about ideas and expres-
sion, without seeking to refine the inquiry.
Another vexing problem with summary judgments for literary
properties is that one work, usually the defendant's, will often have
163. The obvious way to accomplish this objective is a more liberal use of 17 U.S.C.
§ 505 (1988), which permits the award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party. In the Ninth
Circuit, however, a prevailing defendant can be awarded fees only if it can show that the
action was frivolous or brought in bad faith. Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 407 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 879 (1983). Prevailing plaintiffs need make no such show-
ing; they may be awarded fees simply because they prevailed. Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1556 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017
(1990).
This is illogical and poor policy; moreover, it grafts a condition onto the statute that
Congress could have placed there but did not. Other circuits have refused to restrict de-
fendants' opportunity to obtain their fees. See, e.g., Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d
151, 154-56 (3d Cir. 1986); Diamond v. Am-Law Pub. Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir.
1984); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 832 (11th Cir.
1982).
The Ninth Circuit bases this discrimination on the policy of encouraging private en-
forcement and deterring infringement. Frank Music Corp., 886 F.2d at 1556. While these
are worthy policy goals, encouraging vigorous defense and deterring non-meritorious suits
are at least equally worthy.
A plaintiff who can find a lawyer willing to work on contingency risks very little by
starting an infringement action. Defense counsel, however, must be paid, regardless of the
action's merit. A routine award of attorneys' fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 to prevailing
defendants would go far to even the odds. If an attorney was required to counsel a client
that he might be liable for defendants' fees if he loses, perhaps fewer "I wrote . . . " suits
would appear on district court dockets.
164. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
had wide exposure, while the other will be obscure or completely un-
known.165 Therefore, even conscientious counsel may have difficulty
applying precedents when the "facts" consist of brief plot synopses
plus a few general observations about other elements. Without more
detailed and specific comparisons, a plaintiff's lawyer can only guess
whether his client's work resembles those that were shown the door
on summary judgment.
Courts have attempted, without much success, to devise "tests"
for substantial similarity. But these tests, even when they do not actu-
ally increase confusion and muddle the inquiry, have not provided the
guidance necessary to separate the sheep from the goats prospec-
tively. Nevertheless, these tests are repeatedly applied, for want of
anything else.
A. The Arnstein Test
The court in Arnstein v. Porter'" developed a three-step, two-
prong test for substantial similarity that has been cited often, probably
because it alone occupied the field for many years. According to the
Arnstein method, a trier of fact must determine if there are any simi-
larities. 67 If there are none, the inquiry ends.168 If there are some
similarities, and evidence of access, then the trier of fact determines if
these "similarities are sufficient to prove copying.' 69 At this point in
the process, "dissection" (analysis of the works' elements) and expert
testimony are appropriate aids.' 7° If copying is established, the trier
of fact applies the second prong of the test, the ordinary lay observer
test, to determine whether the copying is illicit. 17 1 "Dissection and
expert testimony are irrelevant [here].' 72 If the defendant "took
from the plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to [the public]
that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to
the plaintiff," then copyright infringement has occurred. 73
165. There are, however, a few exceptions to this rule, notably the Star Wars dispute.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983) (both Bat-
tlestar Galactica and Star Wars had wide exposure). One court solved this problem by
printing the entire texts of the works in controversy in its opinion. Pendleton v. Acuff-
Rose Publications, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 477 (D. Tenn. 1984). This effort proved very helpful,
though it obviously makes for thicker reporters. However, it is impractical for anything
other than brief songs-the works involved here.
166. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.






173. Id. at 473.
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This "test" does not lend itself to easy application. The Arnstein
court listened to both the plaintiff's and the defendant's musical com-
positions and found similarities.'74
[B]ut we hold that unquestionably, standing alone, they do not com-
pel the conclusion, or permit the inference, that defendant copied.
The similarities, however, are sufficient so that, if there is enough
evidence of access to permit the case to go to the jury, the jury may
properly infer that the similarities did not result from
coincidence.' 75
According to its own test, enunciated a few paragraphs earlier, "the
trier of the facts must determine whether the similarities are sufficient
to prove copying."' 76 If the appellate court can make that determina-
tion based on the record before it, why must there be a trial? Be-
cause, says the Arnstein majority, access is a question of fact.'7 7 If the
defendant had access to the plaintiff's compositions, then these simi-
larities, which now are insufficient to prove copying, may be trans-
formed into sufficient similarities. 78
This prestidigitation with similarities-now they're insufficient,
now they're not-and the two-part test were sharply criticized by
Judge Clark, the dissenter in Arnstein and a champion of summary
judgment.'79 Warning that the court's holding represented "an invita-
tion to the strike suit par excellence,' ' 18 0 Judge Clark attacked the
"anti-intellectual and book-burning nature of [this] decision,"'' which
exalted the uninstructed intuition of juries over an informed decision
as a matter of law.
I find nowhere any suggestion of two steps in adjudication of this
issue, one of finding copying which may be approached with ...
intelligence and assistance of experts, and another that of illicit
copying which must be approached with complete ignorance; nor do
I see how rationally there can be any such difference, even if a jury
. ..could be expected to separate those issues and the evidence
accordingly. If there is actual copying, it is actionable, and there are
no degrees; what we are dealing with is the claim of similarities suf-
ficient to justify the inference of copying. This is a single deduction
to be made intelligently, not two with the dominating one to be
made blindly.182
174. Id. at 469.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 468.
177. Id. at 469.
178. Id.
179. See Charles E. Clark, Clarifying Amendments to the Federal Rules?, 14 OHIO ST.
L.J. 241, 249-50 (1953).
180. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 479 (Clark, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 478.
182. Id. at 476 n..
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B. The Krofft Test
In 1977, Sid and Marty Krofft, puppeteers and producers of chil-
dren's television shows, won an appeal upholding a judgment received
in a suit against McDonald's Corporation for using some of the
Kroffts' characters in McDonald's commercials. 183 In the course of
this opinion, the Ninth Circuit enunciated a test, now known as the
Krofft test, for substantial similarity. Claiming to build on Arnstein,84
the Krofft court tried to distinguish between the uncopyrightable
"idea" and the copyrightable "expression," a distinction nowhere
mentioned in Arnstein.85 The Krofft court grafted the two-part Arn-
stein test onto the idea/expression dichotomy and emerged with the
"extrinsic/intrinsic" test. 86
Briefly stated, the court or trier of fact looks first for similarity of
ideas.'8 7 The Krofft court regarded this as an often simple determina-
tion which depends on "specific criteria which can be listed and ana-
lyzed."' 88 Analysis and expert testimony are appropriate, as they are
in the first step of the Arnstein test.189 This is the "extrinsic" test.190
If the court determines that there is similarity of ideas, it then
applies the "intrinsic test." This test, to determine if expression is sim-
ilar, depends on the response of the ordinary reasonable person.' 91
The court finds this a "more subtle and complex" determination,
while forbidding analysis and expert testimony at this point.192
Regardless of whether the Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted
Arnstein, the test spelled out in Krofft has been criticized for limiting
the opportunities for summary judgment.193 If only similarity of ideas
can be decided as a matter of law, then most suits must go to trial,
183. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977).
184. Id. at 1165.
185. Id.






192. Id. This stricture appears to run afoul of Federal Rule of Evidence 704, which
permits expert testimony on "an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
Professor Nimmer objects to this formulation from the opposite viewpoint, that of a
plaintiff whose work has been copied. If the theft is clever enough to deceive an ordinary
observer, whose ignorance the court carefully cultivates, then a plaintiff whose work is
actually appropriated will find himself without remedy. 3 NIMMER, supra note 30,
§ 13.03[E]. From whatever viewpoint one approaches the ordinary observer test, the pre-
mium placed on ignorance is wholly inexplicable.
193. 3 NIMMER, supra note 30, 13.03[E].
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because there is usually some similarity of expression between the two
works involved.
The most glaring flaw in the Krofft test is its treatment of analysis
and expert testimony. The court's formulation seems exactly back-
wards. Taking the test as the court sets it out, it is clear that neither a
court deciding a summary judgment motion nor a trier of fact needs
much expert assistance to determine similarity of ideas at the level
enunciated in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 9 4 Even someone
who has spent all his free time watching Oprah and Wheel of Fortune
or playing video games can tell if two works are both about the Viet-
nam War, or if they are both set in outer space, or if both plots involve
love triangles. It is with similarity of expression that non-experts need
help. How is the court or trier of fact to know, for example, if the
traits of a movie character are drawn from a specific novel or are in-
stead part of a stock type? Unless the jury is composed of mystery
buffs, how can it tell whether a certain plot twist common to two
works is evidence of copying or a moss-covered device? Is a meta-
phor original or a clich6? Are episodes in a historical novel facts or
inventions? Copyright liability turns on such questions, which non-
experts cannot answer without a sense of the context that surrounds
the two works. This context is what expert testimony should supply;
this is what the Krofft test cuts off when it is most needed.
Krofft involved visual figures, and there is a strong argument to
be made that it should be limited to its facts: cartoon characters
drawn from puppets and used to advertise fast food. It has generated
only confusion when applied in other contexts. Courts that have had
to deal with these properties after Krofft have, for the most part, tried
to modify it, if not completely overhaul it, to arrive at a sensible deci-
sion. The court in Berkic v. Crichton,9 5 for example, struggled val-
iantly to apply the test to literary works that were the subject of a
summary judgment motion before it:
The test for "substantial similarity of ideas" compares, not basic
plot ideas for stories, but the actual concrete elements that make up
the total sequence of events and the relationships between the ma-jor characters. The extrinsic test for similarity of ideas looks beyond
the vague, abstracted idea of a general plot and instead "focuses on
... the objective details of the work.... The extrinsic test requires
194. "[T]here is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise a playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931), quoted in Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prod. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
195. 761 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1985).
19931
a comparison of plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, and
sequence."'
96
More recently, in Shaw v. Lindheim,197 the court pointed out that
[n]ow that it includes virtually every element that may be consid-
ered concrete in a literary work, the extrinsic test as applied to
books, scripts, plays and motion pictures can no longer be seen as a
test for mere similarity of ideas. Because the criteria incorporated
into the extrinsic test encompass all objective manifestation of crea-
tivity, the two tests are more sensibly described as objective and
subjective analyses of expression, having strayed from Krofft's divi-
sion between expression and ideas.198
One can characterize this state of affairs as "straying" if so inclined, or
it can be seen as an effort to be "sensible" while lying in Krofft's Pro-
crustean bed. So much straying or so much effort, however, strongly
suggests that something in the opinion was radically flawed in the first
place.' 99
Both the Krofft test and the Arnstein test are probably psycholog-
ically impossible to apply. Judge Clark alluded to the difficulty juries
would have in keeping the issues and the evidence separated as the
Arnstein majority required.2° Contrary to the representations made
in the opinions, both tests require a most extraordinary observer: a
total amnesiac. After dissecting the works and listening to expert tes-
timony to determine if there has been copying (Arnstein) or similarity
of ideas (Krofft), the observer must forget what he has discovered or
learned in order to apply the part of the test that determines liability,
either illicit copying (Arnstein) or similarity of expression (Krofft). 201
196. Id. at 1293.
197. 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
198. Id. at 1357.
199. See the discussion of Krofft, Shaw, and Feist in 3 NIMMER, supra note 30,
§ 13.03[E].
200. 154 F.2d 464, 476 n.1 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).
201. The court in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J.
1982), also noticed the psychological difficulty involved here. Attempting to apply the
teaching of Universal Athletic Sales v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
863 (1975), it found itself
in the very delicate position of having to identify sufficiently similarities between
two works to justify a finding of appropriation without simultaneously making the
identification impermissibly detailed so as to constitute forbidden "dissection."
... This court ... will attempt to walk the fine line between the permissible and
impermissible in its comparison of the works before it.
Midway Mfg. Co., 546 F.Supp. at 139.
The Third Circuit "test," also purporting to build on Arnstein, demonstrates the amaz-
ing muddle that results from actually trying to go through this process. After an impene-
trable discussion of the Arnstein procedure, the Universal Athletic Sales court whimsically
notes that "[w]hile 'rose is a rose is a rose is a rose,' substantial similarity is not always
substantial similarity." 511 F.2d at 907. It is a sad state of affairs if Gertrude Stein is more
straightforward than legal analysis.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 16:51
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
If these tests were taken seriously, every substantial similarity suit
would require two trials, each with different juries.
Although the tests purport to defer to the experience of an "ordi-
nary observer," they, and the opinions that use them, misrepresent the
mental processes that a reader or viewer would actually use to arrive
at a decision about the similarity of two works. The tests assume that
a reader or viewer dissects or analyzes first to see if there are similari-
ties of ideas, then checks the "total concept and feel"2 °2 for similarity
of expression. It is unlikely that anyone's mind in fact works that way.
First, the reader or viewer gets an impression of similarity or differ-
ence, then, if called upon to do so, analyzes the two works to explain
what gave him such an impression.
What actually happens in a summary judgment motion in a copy-
right infringement suit? First, the judge receives the moving papers.
With the moving papers she may also get the two properties, unless
she has already received them as exhibits to the complaint. Next, the
judge either reads the parties' papers or her clerk's memo about them
and, if she has not done so, reads or views the properties. If she reads
the papers first, she is already alerted about what to look for in the
properties.
The judge reviews the properties one right after the other, or per-
haps, with some time intervening between them. But, she does this
review in the context of a lawsuit for infringement, not as the last
thing before dropping off to sleep or for recreation on the weekend.
Consciously or unconsciously, she is therefore looking for similarities.
Not surprisingly, she usually finds them. Where it might not occur to
her to hold the television show she saw last night in her mind with the
novel she read on vacation two years ago, this context compels her to
compare them. It is not the context in which the elusive ordinary ob-
server would encounter the two works.20 3
Both Krofft and Arnstein are psychologically unrealistic because
they expect a reader or viewer to hold off making an immediate over-
all assessment of the two works. Most people asked to compare two
works will form an initial impression about them as a whole immedi-
ately; they will simply appear similar or dissimilar, without regard to
what is protectable and what is not. Only after forming an initial im-
202. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
203. It could be argued that a courtroom is never the context in which an ordinary
observer would encounter two works. To expect anyone-judge or jury member-to con-
duct himself or herself as an ordinary observer in such a highly artificial and contrived
environment is expecting a great deal.
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pression will a reader or viewer look at individual elements and
details.
The second step of the analysis is a close study of its major ele-
ments. In most fictional works, a few standard elements should be
discussed routinely: plot, tone, character, setting, genre, and theme.
Depending on the nature of the properties to be compared, other ele-
ments might also require analysis. To compare two works, the reader
or viewer breaks down each work into these elements and analyzes
comparable categories for similarities in protectable expression. This
is the obvious place for expert testimony, properly directed. The
reader or viewer checks his own analysis against the information pro-
vided by experts to be sure that he is not crediting the plaintiff with
originating something that actually has its origin elsewhere. At this
point, the differences between protectable and non-protectable ex-
pression also need emphasis, so the reader or viewer can distinguish
between the two.
The final stage requires checking the initial impression against
the information gleaned from analysis. Here the reader must put the
two processes-one intuitive and the other analytical-together. The
previous analysis has necessarily narrowed the focus; now it broadens
out to allow him to see the work with each element related to each
other and to the whole, with the added caveat that only protectable
expression may be considered in determining whether substantial sim-
ilarity exists. The last step guards against the tendency to pounce on
some insignificant detail and find similarity based solely on it.2" The
reader now checks, and if necessary modifies, his initial "gut" reaction
against a reasoned, disciplined investigation of the works' elements
and the principles of copyright law.2"5
This method of analyzing literary properties is much more helpful
to both parties and counsel than the present random analysis usually
encountered. A lawyer counseling a prospective plaintiff would know
what to compare in his client's and the alleged infringer's works. Ex-
pert witnesses would know how to structure their testimony. And
counsel would have a way of assessing a client's chances of resisting a
summary judgment and prevailing at trial or of obtaining a summary
judgment.
204. This is a tendency much feared, but not often encountered, in summary judgment
cases.
205. Actually, these neat stages probably falsify the process as much as do Arnstein and
Kroffi. A constant oscillation between analysis and intuition is more realistic. The reader
registers his initial impression, then checks it as he looks at individual elements, modifying
both analysis and impression as he proceeds. Opinions that reflected this process, how-
ever, would be interminable and, finally, not worth the effort of recording and reading.
[Vol. 16:51
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The outcomes of such an analysis for summary judgment pur-
poses under the law as it is at present would be variations on a few
themes: "When I first looked at these works, I thought they were sub-
stantially similar/dissimilar, and now that I have studied them more
closely, I still think they are substantially similar/dissimilar in protect-
able expression." "When I first looked at these works, I thought they
were substantially similar/dissimilar, but now that I have studied them
more closely, I realize that they are actually substantially dissimilar/
similar in protectable expression." And finally, "When I first looked
at these works, I thought they were similar/dissimilar, but now that I
have studied them more closely, I can't tell whether they are substan-
tially similar/dissimilar in protectable expression or not, so a jury will
have to decide." Structuring a test this way acknowledges that the
reviewer will have an initial reaction and builds that reaction into the
analysis, so that it operates in the open. The Krofft test forces the
initial reaction underground, where it can influence decisions
unacknowledged.
Considering the pattern of reported summary judgment deci-
sions, a court would be infrequently called upon to grant a summary
judgment to a plaintiff with a literary property. Most of the time, the
question before the court is whether the case should be tried or
whether the defendant's motion should be granted. If the court finds
substantial similarities in protectable expression in some elements but
not others, it probably should deny summary judgment.
I
Conclusion
This Article surveys reported decisions on summary judgment
motions that turn on the issue of substantial similarity. It categorizes
these decisions by moving and responding party and summarizes the
arguments that have proven successful in each category.
The survey reveals that the overwhelming majority of summary
judgment cases are decided in favor of moving defendants and that
these cases follow a highly predictable pattern. One reason proposed
for this imbalance is the inadequacy of substantial similarity tests cur-
rently in use, which are so difficult to apply that opinions do not pro-
vide the guidance necessary to parties and counsel contemplating a
lawsuit for copyright infringement. A different method of comparing
literary properties is proposed, one that more accurately reflects the
mental processes of a reader or viewer comparing two works.
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